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  John Rawls (1921–2002) and his work are 
now squarely a subject for history.1 In the more 
than fifteen years since his death, a rich body of 
scholarship has emerged which attempts, in 
different ways, to understand the nature, 
development, and impact of Rawls's thought 
from a variety of historical perspectives. With 
2021 marking fifty years since A Theory of Justice 
(1971) was first published, this special forum 
examines what we here call the “historical 
Rawls.” 
  The papers in this forum build on and 
critically engage with ongoing efforts to 
historicize both Rawls's interventions and 
postwar anglophone analytical political 
philosophy more broadly.2 The authors work 
across the disciplines of African American 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS   
This special issue began life as a conference held at the University of Oxford in 2017 to mark the 
fifteenth anniversary of Rawls's death. The editors wish to thank each of the participants and 
commentators whose contributions made for such a stimulating event. We must also thank the 
Department of Politics and International Relations and the John Fell Fund at Oxford for their 
generous financial support. We are grateful to Tim Scanlon and Margaret Rawls for their permission 
to cite material from the Rawls Papers held at Harvard. Robert Cheah provided exemplary editorial 
and research support which improved the individual articles, and the forum as a whole, in 
innumerable ways. 
studies, history, philosophy, and politics, 
bringing a variety of disciplinary perspectives to 
existing scholarship, while pushing it in new 
and exciting directions. Each draws on the 
archives of Rawls's papers, held at Cornell, 
Princeton, and, most abundantly, Harvard.3 
  Much of the archival work on Rawls to date 
has focused on his early thought leading up to 
A Theory of Justice (hereafter TJ), paying 
particular attention to his religious background 
and turn to analytic philosophy.4 The essays in 
this forum, however, point beyond 1971 to 
historicize the arguments Rawls presented in 
Political Liberalism (1993), The Law of Peoples 
(1999), and Justice as Fairness: A Restatement 
(2001), and to connect these later works to the 
preoccupations of his youth.5 Our contributors 
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speak also to topics often flagged in previous 
historical work on Rawls, but rarely discussed 
in detail—from race to political economy, 
pedagogy, and the politics of knowledge. They 
further acknowledge the unsung contributions 
of Rawls's many correspondents—including 
feminist critics, free-market economists, and 
Harvard colleagues—to his published arguments 
and to some of his most famously “Rawlsian” 
formulations. Their efforts to trace the 
development of Rawls's thinking are the 
product of years of careful work, which this 
forum now presents in its fullest form. 
  The varied perspectives on the “historical 
Rawls” presented here thus offer new insights 
into Rawls's life and works. Hidden 
interlocutors come into view, as do persistent, 
yet previously unacknowledged, 
preoccupations. Moreover, several of the essays 
address abiding puzzles in Rawls's theory—
including the aims and limitations of ideal 
theory and its capacity to address racial 
injustice. All provide an opportunity to reflect 
critically on the inherited categories and 
practices of contemporary analytic political 
philosophy, as well as its relation to other 
disciplines. Throughout this forum, our 
authors question the standard histories that 
political theorists and philosophers tell about 
their disciplines, and so reveal the circuitous 
route by which Rawls's now influential theory 
developed, as well as the complementary 
processes by which disciplinary shibboleths 
emerged and boundaries took shape. In doing 
so, they recover and render explicit the moral 
and political stakes of debates which have since 
travelled a long way from their early contexts.6 
  Efforts to historicize major figures in the 
history of political philosophy are sometimes 
dismissed as of little more than “antiquarian” 
interest. Historians will be all too familiar with 
the request that they explain why their findings 
should matter to normative theorists, for whom 
studies of the context, development or 
influence of an argument—interesting as those 
stories might be—are assumed to hold little 
theoretical or philosophical significance. And 
yet it is striking that much of the current push 
to “historicize” Rawls comes from scholars who, 
regardless of their institutional homes, identify 
primarily as political theorists, not as historians. 
The essays collected in this forum thus 
contribute to ongoing discussions about how 
and why historical understanding matters for 
political philosophy and theory: not least, for 
ensuring that exegetical elisions are not made 
between the “best form” of an argument and 
the argument that a historical figure actually 
made. In many cases they help us to see more 
clearly the gap between what Rawls himself 
argued and what many of his later interpreters 
suggested (or perhaps wished) he had argued. 
That is, they allow us to see more clearly what 
can be a significant, though often understated, 
distance between Rawls and the Rawlsians. 
  The contributions to this forum also offer 
broader perspectives on what political 
philosophers and theorists might gain from a 
deeper knowledge of the histories of their field. 
Each reveals a Rawls who resists many of the 
categorizations created for him by friends, 
followers and fellow travelers, which 
nonetheless persist into the present. Many of 
them also press questions about patterns of 
exclusion in analytical political philosophy. In 
their accounts of why certain paths were not 
taken in the past, they offer theorists an 
opportunity to consider whether those paths—
or some version of them—can be explored in the 
future. 
  In the first essay, Sophie Smith develops an 
extensive historiographical review by placing 
both the articles in this volume and earlier 
archivally informed historiography within a 
longer context of attempts to historicize Rawls, 
with the aim of delineating more clearly what is 
new and what is old from this broader 
perspective. This survey shows that there was, 
from the earliest reception of TJ, a deep impulse 
to situate Rawls and his work in history, and a 
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wide range of views about how best to do so. It 
reveals in turn—and in the context of such 
pluralism—the move made by many of Rawls's 
students and friends in the years immediately 
before and after his death to direct (and, Smith 
argues, at times to constrain) how future 
generations would approach Rawls's past. 
Looking at more recent historiography reveals 
both the successes and the limitations of these 
early and sometimes preemptive attempts at 
“memorialization”; it also reveals the ways in 
which archival discoveries have both vindicated 
and called into question a series of earlier 
assumptions about Rawls's place in history. 
Smith's piece ends with some reflections on the 
politics of the archive and on what the history 
of the “historical Rawls” suggests for the future 
of historicizing twentieth-century political 
philosophy. 
  Nikhil Krishnan's essay explores how Rawls's 
early reception was informed from the start by 
the oft-repeated suggestion that political 
philosophy was on its deathbed in the mid-
twentieth century. Krishnan seeks to 
complicate, rather than deny, this narrative by 
situating it within the larger context of the 
development of anglophone philosophy in the 
decades before Rawls wrote, and in light of the 
traumatic experience of the Second World War 
shared by many of its key personnel. What, he 
asks, is being affirmed when scholars endorse 
and deploy so freighted a piece of analysis as the 
death-and-revival trope? Taking the reader from 
early twentieth-century Vienna to mid-century 
Oxford, via Princeton, Cornell, and Harvard, 
Krishnan elaborates the views of many of the 
philosophers Rawls had read or met: including 
Bertrand Russell, A. J. Ayer, W. V. O. Quine, 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, G. E. M. Anscombe, R. 
M. Hare, Philippa Foot and H. L. A. Hart. 
Here, Krishnan locates both continuity and 
rupture, arguing that Rawls shared with logical 
positivists, for example, a sense of the subject 
matter of philosophy, even as he bracketed off 
the semantic focus of that older analytic 
tradition. So, too, Krishnan suggests, do we see 
continuity between Rawls's ethical naturalism 
and that of Anscombe and Foot, whose work he 
encountered directly in Oxford. The Rawls we 
see from Krishnan's perspective sought to show 
analytical philosophy what it could achieve by 
way of “substantial” political thought from the 
inside, with many of the resources it had already 
developed. 
  Brandon Terry turns our attention from 
Rawls's formative experience of the Second 
World War to the Vietnam War, and deploys 
newly discovered archival evidence to 
demonstrate the latter's importance for 
understanding the relationship between 
Rawlsian ideal theory and the realities of racial 
injustice. Terry's paper locates two broad trends 
in the reception of Rawls's writings on race. On 
one side, critical race theorists and some recent 
historians regard Rawls's theory as in general 
inattentive to race, and as failing to recognize it 
as an independent cause of inequalities of fair 
opportunity, in particular. On the other, Terry 
suggests that liberal egalitarians, responding to 
criticisms of Rawls's handling of racial injustice, 
often adopt a “defensive posture of silence.” If 
we look more closely at the contemporary 
politics of the draft, Terry argues, as well as to 
Rawls's own attempt to convince Harvard to 
denounce the system of deferments for college 
students, we see a different picture. By drawing 
on a series of archival discoveries and putting 
them in the context of 1960s debates about the 
racial injustice of the draft and the war itself, 
Terry argues that Rawls's objections were 
motivated by a concern not simply for the broad 
injustice of the draft, but for its racial injustice 
in particular. This new history becomes the 
basis for an intervention into contemporary 
debates about the possibilities, and the limits, 
of Rawls's theory: Terry offers a critique of 
Rawls that focuses not on his reliance on 
idealization per se, but on a vision of politics 
based on a faith in the possibility of some 
minimal consensus. Through a comparison 
between Rawls and the political philosophy of 
his younger contemporary, Martin Luther King, 
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Terry offers a revisionist reading of the terms on 
which utopian strivings for justice must 
proceed. 
  Stefan Eich traces an alternative trajectory in 
Rawls's thinking through the post-Second 
World War period while situating A Theory of 
Justice in a longer—and unexpected—
philosophical tradition. Eich places Rawls's 
vision of society in the context of the economic 
boom experienced by the US during the 
Bretton Woods years (1944–71), when future 
growth was assumed and predictions about the 
end of scarcity were widespread. This 
confidence in growth lay behind what Eich 
interprets as Rawls's early secular theodicy—a 
vision Eich ties to the thought of Gottfried 
Leibniz and Christian Wolff. This 
interpretation is based in part on his own 
archived notes, wherein Eich shows that Rawls 
himself entertained the language of theodicy 
explicitly before he redescribed his project in 
the more familiar (and palatable) Kantian terms 
of “reasonable faith.” And yet, as Eich points 
out, the conditions that held true as Rawls was 
writing TJ summarily collapsed soon after it was 
published. This explains what is, in Eich's view, 
a significant change in Rawls's account of 
stability between TJ and Political Liberalism. The 
story of Rawls's theory presented by Eich is thus 
one of a tension that Rawls never managed to 
overcome: between the recognition of an unjust 
present and a “reasonable faith” in a liberal 
future. 
  In their essay, Ben Jackson and Zofia 
Stemplowska also explore the importance of 
political economy to Rawls's thought while 
showing that the project of historicization 
cannot rely on the Rawls archives alone. Putting 
Rawls in context requires looking not only at 
what he was saying to and about others, but also 
at what others were saying to and about him. 
Drawing on the archival papers of Friedrich 
Hayek, Gordon Tullock, and James Buchanan, 
as well as the Rawls papers, Jackson and 
Stemplowska tell the story of Rawls's early warm 
reception by men who would become the 
heroes of late twentieth-century neoliberalism. 
They also build on their previous work to reveal 
the shared importance for both Rawls and 
Buchanan of the Chicago economist Frank 
Knight, who influenced Rawls's ideas about 
(amongst other things) desert and his 
conception of politics as a “game” with “fair 
rules.”7 As Jackson and Stemplowska point out, 
the emergence in the late 1970s of the polarized 
divide between social democrats and 
neoliberals can occlude the early shared 
influences and assumptions between Rawls and 
figures like Hayek and Buchanan with whom he 
was later in opposition. Jackson and 
Stemplowska thus chart the shared intellectual 
context that made seeming allies of Rawls and 
Buchanan in the 1950s, and the distance that 
opened between them in the years after TJ was 
published. What emerges is an illuminating 
new genealogy for Rawls's notion of ideal theory 
and its “realist” critics. 
  Murad Idris turns from economics to 
Middle Eastern area studies to reveal how the 
disciplinary politics of the latter shaped a text 
so far left largely untouched by historians: The 
Law of Peoples. This book began life as a 
published lecture Rawls gave for Amnesty 
International in 1993 where he developed 
principles of justice for interstate relations. 
Over the next six years, Rawls expanded it into 
a short monograph and, as Idris shows, made a 
striking late addition: a hypothetical Muslim 
state named “Kazanistan.” Drawing on archival 
reading notes, correspondence and early drafts, 
Idris offers the first full account of the story of 
Kazanistan's emergence in Rawls's thought. He 
reveals the sources behind many of his 
descriptions and assumptions, one of which 
was the Harvard historian Roy Mottahedeh. 
Idris presents the invention of Kazanistan as an 
act of imaginative founding in the service of 
Rawls's own political project: to offer grounds 
for the “toleration” by liberal societies of 
“decent” non-liberal ones. The genealogy of 
Kazanistan, Idris argues, illustrates how ideal 
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theory extracts data from other disciplines to 
construct other peoples, often without regard 
for the surrounding disciplinary politics. 
Particularly relevant here is the way in which 
the texts Rawls drew upon were themselves 
operating in a broader historiographical 
context, one grappling with assumptions about 
Islam's compatibility with democracy. By 
reconstructing the sources that informed 
Kazanistan, Idris reveals the way that Rawls's 
ideal theory was “quietly structured by the 
politics of scholarship about Islam and area 
studies.” What emerges in Idris's account is a 
case study of the contingencies involved in the 
construction of any ideal theory: Rawls relied 
on a small selection of sources suggested to him 
by his immediate circle of Harvard faculty and 
fellow political philosophers. In a conclusion 
that might also serve as a general theme of this 
forum, Idris suggests that analytical political 
philosophers attend more closely to the history 
and politics of knowledge production in the 
disciplines they rely upon to inform their 
normative theories. 
  In the final essay, Teresa Bejan explores the 
development of Rawls's final methodological 
statements about the “tradition of political 
philosophy” in Justice as Fairness: A Restatement 
(2001). In the process, she takes up Mark Bevir's 
call for historians to use the archive to attend to 
Rawls's teaching.8 By looking more closely at 
Rawls's published and unpublished lectures in 
moral and political philosophy at Harvard 
(delivered regularly from 1962), as well as their 
forebears from his time at Cornell and MIT, 
Bejan argues that Rawls's teaching of “the 
tradition” as culminating always in his own 
works-in-progress played a central role in the 
development of his philosophical views. Bejan 
offers a series of moments in the 1950s that 
were crucial to Rawls's increasing interest in the 
tradition: his year in Oxford in 1952–3 when 
Rawls came to think, she argues, of “canonical 
authors as a source … of philosophic insight and 
inspiration”; the debates in the mid-1950s over 
the alleged “death” of political philosophy; and 
in 1958, when Rawls began to teach an 
undergraduate survey course at Cornell. It is at 
this last juncture, Bejan suggests, that Rawls 
cultivated a truly reflexive relationship with the 
tradition inspired by John Plamenatz, who 
would later become one of Quentin Skinner's 
chief methodological targets. This all paved the 
way for Rawls's own teaching life at Harvard, 
during which time he would, in Bejan's view, 
develop a new relationship with the tradition: 
from a young reader eager to point out error, to 
a teacher who advocated charity, respect and a 
keenness to learn from the past. The history of 
Rawls's own increasingly contextual 
engagement with the tradition should be taken 
as a reminder, Bejan argues, of the centrality of 
teaching—what we choose to teach and how—to 
the practice of political philosophy itself. 
  Taken together, these essays reveal many of 
the contexts against which both Rawls and the 
broader history of analytical political 
philosophy should be understood. In carving 
out these new paths and in drawing attention 
to aspects of the archive so far unexplored, 
these essays also comment implicitly on the 
politics of historical writing. The emerging 
project that is the “historical Rawls” has itself 
been shaped by choices made by past actors.9 
The stories we can tell about Rawls and 
analytical liberalism are constrained by what 
has been preserved; what is preserved is often a 
reflection of who and what are considered 
worth memorializing. But, as these essays show, 
the stories that do get told are also a reflection 
of a scholar's sense of “what matters” in the 
archive. These choices are informed not only by 
genre—conceptual genealogy, intellectual 
biography, broader narrative history—but also 
by background assumptions about the very 
point of historicization: are we looking to 
vindicate or debunk Rawls's arguments, or 
simply to better understand them? Do we wish 
to recover paths not taken and revive past 
possibilities, or to “exorcize” his ghost from the 
discipline?10 
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  Choices about what matters will be further 
informed—without being determined—by 
prevailing disciplinary preoccupations, which 
are themselves rarely immune from existing 
structures of injustice and the academy's own 
hierarchies of knowledge. The essays in this 
forum show that to bring new questions to the 
archive is to open up the space for a variety of 
original and important stories. And while we 
leave it to the essays to speak for themselves 
about the implications of an increasingly 
historicized Rawls in their chosen domain, we 
conclude by emphasizing a note of caution 
sounded by many of our authors. There is much 
left to say about John Rawls and his archive, 
and indeed about the history of political 
philosophy in the twentieth century. In writing 
those histories, however, we must be alert to 
how exclusionary practices past and present 
have shaped not only the discipline and the 
archive, but also widespread assumptions about 
just which histories are worth telling.   
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